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SALT TWO-I  
US/USSR Plenary Meeting No. 6  
USSR Mission  
1100 Hours, December 18, 1972

Persons Present

Ambassador Smith	Minister Semenov
Ambassador Farley	General Trusov
Mr. Nitze	Mr. Shchukin
Dr. Brown	Mr. Grinevsky
General Allison	Mr. Chulitsky
Dr. Garthoff	General Beletsky
Colonel FitzGerald	Mr. Skoptsov
Dr. Ifft	Captain Mazerkin
Dr. Wade	Mr. Turalin
Mr. Jones	Mr. Starodubov
Captain Matthes	Mr. Budantsev
Dr. Weiler	Mr. Obukhov
Mr. Stivers	Mr. Shelepin
Dr. Zemach	Mr. Yevseev
Lt Commander Martin	Mr. Klyukin (Interpreter)
Mr. Arensbarger (Interpreter)	Mr. Sudonkin (Interpreter)

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Minister Semenov opened the sixth plenary meeting of SALT Two by welcoming the U.S. Delegation to the Soviet Mission. He then gave the floor to Ambassador Smith.

Ambassador Smith then delivered the U.S. prepared statement.

Minister Semenov acknowledged the U.S. statement; he then delivered his own prepared statement.

Minister Semenov asked Ambassador Smith if the U.S. had any other considerations.

Ambassador Smith replied that the U.S. side had no further considerations to address.

Minister Semenov stated that in that case it was necessary to resolve the question of the next meeting.

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Ambassador Smith proposed that the next meeting be held at 1100 hours on Wednesday, December 20; he added that he had in mind that this would be the final plenary meeting of this session.

Minister Semenov responded that it would be more suitable to hold the meeting on Friday, December 22.

Ambassador Smith stated that Mr. Garthoff reminded him that the sides have a document agreed ad referendum in which December 21 is referred as the terminal date for this session.

Minister Semenov replied that "Mr. Garthoff is a master of compromise." He stated that 1100 hours, Thursday, December 21, is acceptable for the final plenary meeting, and that the questions of procedure which might arise can be taken into consideration by the Executive Secretaries.

Drafted by: LCdr R.K. Martin

Approved by: Dr. E.M. Ifft

Dr. R.L. Garthoff

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SMITH  
(December 18, 1972)

Mr. Minister:

I.

Today I shall respond to your remarks at this session addressing elements of force which have come to be known as forward-based systems (FBS), and related issues. It is evident that the two sides have, from the outset, had substantially different approaches to the question of the composition of the strategic offensive arms to be limited.

The U.S. believes that we are charged with the limitation of the strategic nuclear arms of the two sides. Our subject is arms, not bases. Furthermore, not all arms, but only certain nuclear arms are included; and not all nuclear offensive arms, but only strategic nuclear offensive arms of the two sides, are to be included.

In addressing the question of the composition of the strategic nuclear arms to be limited, the U.S. side from the outset has taken an essentially pragmatic approach. In other words, it addressed the question of what nuclear offensive

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arms and what defenses against them should be limited in order to further the objectives of our talks. We conceived these objectives to be to increase the security of both sides by enhancing the stability of the strategic relationship between us in accordance with the principle of no unilateral advantage to either side.

The Soviet side has proceeded from a deductive approach flowing from what seems to us to be a contrived definition of the word "strategic." The central concept of that approach appears to be that any nuclear delivery system which could be caused to strike the national territory of the other side should be presumed to be strategic. Under this concept, it was further maintained by the Soviet side that the location of a launching device at some point in time and the delivery range of that launching device would determine what is strategic. However, virtually all aircraft and missile systems have a range of more than the few miles which separate the national territories of the Soviet Union from that of the United States.

Subsequently, the Soviet side introduced modifications to this concept; one was to suggest that exception should be made for Chukotka and Alaska. When the U.S. side pointed out that submarine-launched cruise missiles have the capability

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of destroying coastal cities, the Soviet side argued in this case that it is not the capability of the system but its mission--to strike targets at sea--which is determinative.

It now appears that certain further modifications are to be made in this deductive chain. We take it that the earlier Soviet position that the location of the launching device at some point of time should be determinative is no longer so. It is now asserted that all attack aircraft carriers, irrespective of geographic location, should be regarded as strategic. There is no suggestion, however, that other systems which are capable of being moved are to be covered by such a criterion. And still further, it appears that range capability of systems is not to be viewed as being their inherent capability but is to be assumed to be limited by certain conditions selected by one side.

Pursuit of a complicated set of changing and evidently self-serving criteria by one side cannot possibly lead to agreement with the other side. On the other hand, to assure at the starting point and at each stage of such a deductive chain that equitable and objective criteria are applied in an even-handed manner would appear to lead into endless and also needless

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complexities. Would it not be better to address directly those limitations which are within the subject matter of our talks and which go to the heart of our objectives with respect to that subject matter?

## II.

As I stated on December 5, SALT deals with the central nuclear fact of the world today: your country and ours can essentially destroy each other. The strategic nuclear balance between us is dynamic. In assuring the stability of this balance, the controlling offensive weapons systems are ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers. Although each of us possesses a number of non-central systems which in one way or another could reach the territory of the other, it is the three central systems on which we should focus since they play the major role in determining the strategic balance.

Mr. Minister, forward-based systems are not of the same significance in the nuclear arms competition as the central systems. The potential posed by these tactical forces is simply not comparable in kind or magnitude to that of ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers.

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III.

In protecting our security interests, both of us have come to rely not only on our armaments, but also on alliances. The historical, political, and military reasons for U.S. alliances and deployment of some U.S. systems on Allied territory are well known. U.S. tactical aviation and tactical missile forces are deployed as an integral element of the military forces which support our alliances. To address these forces as the Soviet side has proposed would involve the whole of general-purpose forces. Such an approach would be both undesirable and impractical.

The Soviet side has suggested that the United States make unilateral and radical changes in its tactical forces and alliance arrangements. You have proposed withdrawal to their national territories of all "nuclear delivery aircraft" and any missiles with nuclear warheads the geographical deployment of which enables them to strike targets on the territory of the other side, and a corresponding liquidation of their bases in third countries. You have also proposed withdrawal of all attack aircraft carriers beyond range of the other side's territory. Mr. Minister, in effect your proposal would work

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basic changes in regional military balances, but would not deal with the factors which necessitate our defensive alliances and the stationing of U.S. forces at sea and abroad.

We are engaged in bilateral negotiations. We will not consider in these discussions limitations which would undermine the security of our Allies or our ability to support the U.S. obligations to our Alliances.

The Soviet side has stated that, in addition to U.S. forward-based systems, Allied SLBM submarines must be taken into account. The U.S. position concerning compensation to the Soviet Union for SLBM submarines belonging to third countries was made clear by the U.S. Delegation on May 24 and again on May 26, 1972. Our position has not changed; the U.S. does not accept the validity of such considerations.

IV.

In the past, Mr. Minister, you have suggested that there are asymmetries in the existing situation with respect

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to U.S. forward bases and aircraft and missiles as now deployed. The asymmetries in non-central systems that affect the military balance between us do not favor the United States.

It is clear that both sides rely on ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers as the major elements of their strategic nuclear power. Beyond these elements, there exist on the two sides various asymmetrical conditions which are not susceptible to precise comparison or quantification -- nuclear offensive force elements such as SLCM's, MR/IRBM's, tactical missiles, medium bombers, and tactical aircraft, and also air defenses, geographic considerations, approaches to force development, and alliances.

Disparities in MR/IRBM's and SLCM's are one-sided; you possess hundreds of each, and the United States has none. Moreover, MR/IRBM's, SLCM's, and medium bombers can strike U.S. bases and forces. SLCM's also possess the capability of striking major U.S. population centers. Soviet medium bombers also have the capability of reaching more than half of the United States, without refueling, from forward bases in the Soviet Union. In addition, modern technical means, for example, aerial refueling, can extend their range. Thus, these systems are relevant in the context of respective capabilities of non-central systems to strike the territory of the other side.

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To single out for separate attention forward-based systems which the United States has in support of its alliances would in effect be to subject that one element to constraint in a situation where corresponding Soviet force elements went unconstrained. This would clearly be unequal and to the unilateral advantage of the Soviet Union, and this is unacceptable to the United States.

Forward-based aircraft are not in the same category as heavy bombers because they do not have the same effect on the strategic relationship. Similarly, we have been willing to consider medium bombers -- of which the USSR has many hundreds, and which have a capability to attack the U.S. -- as not in the same category as heavy bombers.

The definition of strategic aircraft you propose would seem to require inclusion of all aircraft on each side capable of carrying nuclear weapons. All fighter bombers, light bombers, and medium bombers would have to be included, since all are or can be made nuclear-capable and can reach targets on the territory of the other country. How could limitations on these aircraft be implemented? Clearly, even

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if aircraft were not located within unrefueled range, this range could readily be extended by refueling. In essence, all aircraft, regardless of their location, are capable of reaching the territory of the other side.

V.

The Soviet side has argued that the United States enjoys unilateral advantage because of its submarine bases in third countries. You have indicated that such bases "reduce significantly the time required for operational deployment of SLBM submarines and eliminate the need for these submarines to return to rear bases located on their own national territory." Because of this reduced transit time, you argue that the United States is able to keep more SLBM's on station than the USSR, giving unilateral advantage to the United States.

Transit time is not a useful criterion in assessing the strategic capability of ballistic missile submarines for a permanent agreement, especially as the range of SLBM's increases. On this point, we would note the recent flights of a Soviet SLBM to a range of about 7,500 km. With SLBM ranges of 7,500 km, Soviet nuclear submarines are capable of striking targets in most of the United States even from their home bases.

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VI.

Mr. Minister, we do not regard forward-based systems as "strategic." We have both recognized that our task, to reach an equitable and verifiable permanent agreement, will be complex. The U.S. side considers that the essential element of our negotiating task is to focus on developing a permanent agreement limiting the central systems of the two sides, without unilateral advantage to either side. We have set forth our views on how this should be done on several occasions, most recently on December 12.

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SEMENOV STATEMENT, December 18, 1972

We have carefully listened to the U. S. Delegation's statement of today. It will be studied from the angle of the ongoing negotiations. For our part we would like to emphasize the following. On the composition of strategic offensive arms in connection with our ongoing negotiations, our approaches have indeed been different from the very beginning. We have repeatedly substantiated our position, at the current phase in Geneva as well. The specific contents of the Soviet proposals we submitted in Geneva are well known to you.

The USSR Delegation has repeatedly pointed out to the U. S. Delegation that resolution of the question of withdrawal of strategic offensive nuclear systems and liquidation of corresponding bases in third countries is a most important factor in ensuring equal security and precluding unilateral advantages. By reason of the well-known Understanding of May 20, 1971, which resulted in conclusion of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, consideration of these questions was postponed to the subsequent stage of negotiations, of which the present Geneva phase constitutes the beginning.

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In connection with entry into force of the Interim Agreement, consideration of the question of withdrawal of strategic offensive nuclear systems and liquidation of corresponding bases, along with limitations on other types of strategic offensive weapons not covered by the Interim Agreement, now acquires primary importance.

I would like to emphasize once again that the Soviet side considers the question of withdrawal of strategic offensive systems and liquidation of corresponding bases in third countries to be one of the most important questions involved in the overall complex of measures to limit strategic offensive arms, and believes that it must be solved in working out an understanding on more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms.

The U.S. side has emphasized, specifically on December 8, 1972, that agreement on limitations which would contribute to maintaining strategic stability is a question of primary importance at our negotiations and that the U.S. side has maintained this position from the very beginning of SALT, believing that "it would be fruitful at our negotiations to strive toward achievement of [Translators note: This is a misquote. Our statement read as follows: "a principal objective of our negotiations would

be to achieve...!] an agreement that would enhance the security of both sides and would contribute to stability."

Viewing the Soviet proposal on withdrawal of strategic offensive nuclear systems and liquidation of corresponding bases in third countries from such an angle, it is impossible not to come to the conclusion that it is aimed at enhancing the security of both sides, reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and increasing trust between our two sides.

Speaking of a desire to enhance the security of both sides, it is impossible to deny the need for also resolving the question of withdrawal of SLBM submarines beyond agreed limits and of liquidating the bases for these submarines on the territories of third countries.

The argument cited by the U. S. side that reduction of the ocean areas within the limits of which SLBM submarines operate, would purportedly reduce their "potential survivability," cannot possibly be recognized as valid. Such an argument can be used for one purpose only--somehow to justify the existence of the bases for these submarines in third countries and to present matters as though there were no need to resolve the question of withdrawal of SLBM submarines.

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A component part of the Soviet proposals is withdrawal of attack carriers beyond agreed limits which would preclude the aircraft thereon from being within range of the territory of the other side. Here we proceed from the premise that all carrier aviation should be considered strategic offensive arms, regardless of the geographic location of attack carriers, since the latter are mobile strategic systems.

The references sometimes made to the relatively short range of carrier-based attack aviation compared to that of strategic bombers, and their resulting allegedly limited capabilities to execute combat missions, are not convincing, even if only because the limited range of carrier aviation is fully compensated for by the practically unlimited cruising range of the aircraft carriers themselves, which in essence are floating airfields.

The question then arises: under present conditions, when carrier aviation is equipped with nuclear weapons, can it be excluded from the composition of strategic offensive arms? No, it cannot.

The proposal set forth by the Soviet side on November 28, 1972 provides for withdrawal to their own national territories

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of all nuclear delivery aircraft and any missiles with nuclear warheads whose geographic location enables them to strike targets on the territory of the other side, together with liquidation of corresponding bases in third countries. The motivation is obvious.

The destructive power of the nuclear weapons used by these systems, and the damage they can inflict, are commensurate with the destructive power and the possible damage inflicted by the warheads of those types of strategic offensive weapons, which are limited by the Interim Agreement. Therefore exclusion of the question of withdrawal of forward-based nuclear systems from consideration at the negotiations and the lack of a mutually acceptable solution for it in working out agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic armaments would lead to unilateral advantages; this is not in accord with the goals of the ongoing negotiations.

A number of favorable prerequisites now exist for successful movement toward working out an agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms. We have accumulated experience in solving complex problems, and the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and the Interim

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Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which were concluded in May of this year, have entered into force. At the present time we are at a new and higher level in our discussions. In this connection, attempts in some form to return to the U.S. Delegation's proposals of August 4, 1970 would be completely unjustified. If we were to take this path, then instead of moving toward mutually acceptable settlement of the problems before us now, we would have to return to old, already travelled ground. After all, the scope and nature of the limitations provided for in the U.S. proposals of August 4, 1970 were clearly rejected by one side and do not meet the tasks now before us in achieving permanent agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms. This should be borne in mind during preparation for the next phase.

In the course of the present phase the U. S. Delegation advanced a proposal, according to which one of the most essential elements of the proposed understanding on limiting strategic offensive arms would be establishment of a ceiling, equal for both sides, on the overall throwweight of land-based ICBMs. We do not understand the purpose for which this

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proposal is put forward. Can it contribute to progress at the negotiations and to enhancement of the required mutual understanding?

We would like to say that such an approach, which takes absolutely no account of the whole totality of the strategic situation, geographic factors and the different directions of the development of military technology on each side, is not in accord with the principle of equal security. Nor is it in accord with the task of working out mutually acceptable agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms.

The USSR Delegation believes that the considerations it has expressed at the current phase will contribute to the productive development of our negotiations.